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CASE COMMENTS

FORFEITURE-PROCEEDINGS

FOR

ENFORCEMENT-AN

ALLEGED

OWNER MAY

BE REQUIRED TO SHOW MORE THAN TITLE AND

REGISTRATION

TO

ESTABLISH

A

SUFFICIENT

PROPERTY

INTEREST

THAT WILL SUPPORT STANDING TO CHALLENGE FORFEITURE

Albert Kammerer and appellant J.

Michael Stumpff jointly

searched for an aircraft to facilitate their drug trafficking activities.I
They purchased a used Douglas DC-4 aircraft and arranged to
have it flown to the Kansas City municipal airport
where the
2
aircraft

was

hangared

pending

supplied the purchase money
completed the sales transaction
registration in his name. 3 Taped
aircraft was intended to be used

certain

repairs.

Kammerer

for the aircraft, but Stumpff
and placed the aircraft title and
conversations established that the
by the two men primarily for the

4
transportation of marijuana into the United States from Mexico.
Based on the wiretap evidence, Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) officers procured a search warrant and seized several
thousand pounds of marijuana and hashish from Kammerer's
residence. 5 Subsequently, the DEA seized the aircraft and initiated

1. United States v. One 1945 Douglas C-54 (DC-4) Aircraft, Serial Number 22186, 604 F.2d 27
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1002 (1982).
2. 604 F.2d at 27.
3. Id. The United States government first learned of the existence of the aircraft from recorded
telephone conversations between Kammerer and Stumpff. Id
4. Id. at 27-28. The conversations were recorded pursuant to a court authorized wiretap on
Kammerer's telephone. Id. at 27.
5. Id. Kammerer pleaded guilty to charges relating to possession of the drugs. Id. at 28.
Apparently no charges were filed against Stumpff.

824

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

6
forfeiture proceedings against it under 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(4).
Stumpff was granted leave to intervene on the basis of his status as
owner of record. 7 The district court found that the evidence
showing the aircraft was "intended to be used'' to transport drugs
was sufficient to meet the requirements of section 881(a)(4). 8 The
district court ordered the aircraft forfeited and Stumpff appealed. 9
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit questioned the constitutionality of the federal forfeiture
statute as applied by the district court and ruled that the issue
whether Stumpff had standing to challenge the forfeiture had to be
considered. 10 The case was remanded."i On remand the district
court found that Kammerer was the true owner even though
Stumpff held the title and registration to the aircraft. 2 The district
court dismissed Stumpff's intervention and again Stumpff
appealed. 13 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the district court decision and held that although evidence showed
the claimant was the registered legal title holder of the aircraft,
other evidence established that the title was placed in the claimant's
name merely as a "subterfuge" to conceal the financial affairs and
drug dealings of Kammerer.' 4 Therefore, the alleged owner,
Stumpff, lacked sufficient interest in the aircraft to have standing to
6.21 U.S.(C.A. §881(a)(4)('Vest 1981)1.The statute provides:
(t)

The following shall be sutbiet to forfeiture to the United States and no

property right shall exist in them:
(4) All convyC.ancles, including aircraft, vehicles. or xessels. wshith are used. or care
intendedfor use, to transport, or in any nanner to faicilitate lhe transporttion, sale,
reccipt, possession. or cimcealhncnt of$-ontrolled substancesi.

Id (i),phasis

added).
7. 604 F.2d at 28. Kammerer chose riot io contest the forfeiture. Id. at 29.
8. Id. The court rejected Stumpff's claim that such an application of the statute was unconstitutional because there was no overt act linking the aircraft to a specific illegal transaction. Id.
it 28. 'I'll (; overnmtiiti t. oi the other hand. suggested that although Stunipff was the ownetr of'
ic(or(, he w\,as riot the true owner and therefore lacked standing to challenge the forfleititre. Id. at 29.
9. Id. at 27. The district court ruled that since the application ofthe statute ,sas constitutional, it
%\;suinc(ssary to address the qLuestion of' standing because to party had a valid defense to the
forleitur. United States v. One 1945 Douglas C-54 (D1C-4) Aircraft. 461 F. Supp. 324, 326 (\t, .D.
Mo. 1978). aff'd 647 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1981). cert. denied. 102 S. Ct. 1002 (1982).
10. 6(14 F.2d at 29. The court of appeals noted that it is the owner ,orowniers ofa rcs who have
tanling to challenge a ftorfeiture. The court state(] that possession of bare legal title tol the rs.
htw'vir. may be insufficient to establish ownership. Id. at 28.
1.I /d. at 29. The court oif appeals retanded the case without valatinig tIe distr it tuitor Order
of fttrfeiture because the coturt o appeals diubtd Stunpff's standing to challenge that order. Id.
12. United States s. One 1945 Douglas C-54 (DC-4) Aircraft, Scrial Number 22186. 647 F.2d
86,, 865 (8th Cir. 1981). cer. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1002 (1982). The district court found that since
Kaititerer was the true owner. Stutipff hid 11 intterest ill the aircraft ind thereftre lacked standing
to challnge the firfeiture. 647 F.2d it 865,
13. 647 F1.2t it 865. The district court distmissed Stottipff's itrventiion ased oft its decision
ilti Stuit pfflackcit standing. Id. at 866.
14. Id. 'le ( ourt of Appeals for the Fighth Circ'uit found that evidence prisented to tie district
(0t1it W;IS ciontsistent with Kaminerer's dloniniion atnd control ovr
the aircr aft The evidence
;tllIg'isIld that Stutmptf was iirels Kamnmnieret s lront-ian and, thte efre, Stnipfl was inotthe true
o nitr ot i' air'raft Id ;at 867
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challenge the forfeiture. 15 United States v. One 1945 Douglas C-54
(DC-4) Aircraft, Serial Number 22186, 647 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1002 (1982).
English common law required that a personal chattel that was
responsible for the death of any reasonable creature be forfeited to
the Crown as a deodand. 16 The King then would provide money for
masses 17 or other pious uses. 18 When its religious application
ceased, the deodand became a source of revenue for the Crown. 19
The forfeiture of the deodand was justified as a penalty for
carelessness. 20 Other forfeitures also resulted at common law from
felony or treason convictions. 2 1 Because such conduct was a breach
of the King's peace, denial of the right to own property was deemed
to be justifiable punishment; therefore the convicted felon's
22
property was forfeited to the Crown.
In addition to common law forfeiture, English law also
provided for statutory forfeiture of offending objects used in
violation of customs and revenue laws. 23 Such forfeitures were
enforced under in rem proceedings 24 against the objects themselves
rather than under in personam proceedings 25 against the object's
26
owner.
The deodand did not become part of the common law of the
15. Id. at 865. The court of appeals found that the district COUll's conclusion that Stumpff was
not the true owner was supported by the evidence and not clearly erroneous. Id.at 866.
16. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-81 (1974). Deodand is
derived from the Latin term Deo dandum, meaning a thing to be given to God. If a man's death was
caused by a harmful chattel, the value of the chattel was forfeited to the King in the belief that the
King would provide money for masses to be said for the good ofthe (lead man's soul. Id. at 681.
17. Id.The origins ofthe deodand are traceable to ancient Biblical practices, which held that the
instiruinCit ofdeath was the accused and religious atonement was required. See Exodus 21:28 ("Ifan
ox gore a man or woman, and they die. then the ox shall be surely stoined, and his flesh shall not be
eten,''),
18. 416 U.S. at 681 (citing 1 W. BLxc<sTONE, COMxi, xTAtES 300). In addition to money for
ttIasses, other deodand proceeds were distributed in alms by the high ahnoncr as charitable donations
to he poor. BtLACK'S LxAw DiCTiONARi 392 (5th ed. 1979).
19. 416 US. at 681. The deocdand institution was abolished in England in 1846. Id.n. 19.
2(1. Id.The abolition of the deodand in England was linked to the passage of lord Campbell's
Act which created a cause ofaction for wrongful death. Id
21. Id. at 682. A convicted felon forfeited his personal property to the King and his land
cscheated to hislord. A convicted traitor forfeited all his property, realand personal, to the King. Id.
22. Id. In 1870, England abolished most fori'feitures of real and personal property from those
convi cl tiffelonies or treason. Id. n. 20.
23. 416 U.S. at 682. The United States Supreme Court suggests fiat statutory forfeitures Were
probably caused b a merger of the deodand tradition and the belief that the right to own property
could be denied a wrongdoer. Id.
24. In rem is a technical term used to designate proccedings or actiuns instituted against a thing
as oppose(] to atnaction against a person. In the strict
sense of the term. a proceeding in reti is atl
action taken directly against property or is oce brought to cnill'tce
a right in the property itself.
Bt s.xc's l.Aw DICTIONARN 713 (5th ed. 1979). See United States v. One 1940 Packard Coupe. 36 F.
Supp 788 (D. Mass. 1941) (inan in rem poticecling against an automobitilet law ascribes to the
o litecthe power of coplicity and guilill tile offense).
25. An in personat proceeding is aniaction seeking judgmen t against a person involving his
perisonal rights and is based on jurisdiction over the person hiiself ratlher
than onjurisdiction over
fis property. BL ACK's LAW Die. rioAR 711 (5th cc]. 1979).
26. 416 U.S. at 682. The English Curt of 'Exchequ used in ret icccedin gs to enforce both
statitor lo tfitures and cotition lawsfelonx' forfeitures. Id.
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United States.2 7 Both English and local forfeiture statutes,
however, were enforced by colonial common law courts and later,
by state courts during the period of Confederation. 2 Today
forfeiture statutes exist in the United States on both the state and
federal levels. 2 9 The purpose of criminal forfeiture statutes is both
to prevent further illicit use of the property and to impose an
economic penalty,
thereby
making such illegal behavior
unprofitable. 30 Forfeiture statutes also help compensate the
government for its enforcement efforts and provide a method of
3
obtaining security for subsequently imposed penalties and fines. 1
The modern statutes are designed to reach almost any property that
may be used in a criminal enterprise.32
Forfeiture proceedings are technically in rem actions and
therefore civil in nature. 33 The effect of a forfeiture, however, is
punitive and therefore criminal in fact. 3 4 The United States
Supreme Court held in Boyd v. United States35 that forfeitures are
quasi-criminal.3 6 Forfeiture proceedings initiated against property
may occur under one of a number of federal statutes, depending on
27. Id. The doctrine of the deodand was considered so repugnant to American ideas of justice
that it was not included as part of the common law of the United States. Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate,
135 Tenn. 509, __
, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (1916). See King v. United States, 364 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.
1966) (court rejects the United States' theory that the rifle used to assassinate President Kennedy
should be forfeited as a deodand).
28. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139(1943).
29. 416 U.S. at 683.
30. Id. at 686-87. When forfeiture provisions are applied to lessors and other parties who are
innocent of any wrongdoing, confiscation may have the desirable effect oficausing those partiis to
exercise greater care when transferring possession of their property- Id. at 688.
31. E.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972) (fnrfeilire
not barred by claimant's acquittal).
32. 416 U.S. at 683. But see United States v. Smith, 497 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Iowa 1980)
(criminal defendant entitled to return of $25,000 he paid in an attempted drug purchase because
forfeiture statute had not yet been amended to include such money); United States v. Ortega, 450 F.
Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (drug purchase money returned to convicted defendant because
forfeiture statute did not include purchase money).
33. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886). In criminal proceedings, rule 41(c) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides a remedy for a defendant aggrieved bv an illegal
seizure. Rule 41(e) states in part:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move . . for the return of
the property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful possession of the property
which was illegally seized .... If the motion is granted the property shall be restored
and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e). See United States v. One Residence and Attached Garage of Anhonyj.
Accordo, 603 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1979) (seized money returned under rule 41(e) motion because
government failed to show any connection between it and any alleged criminal act of the defendant);
United States v. United States Currency Amounting to the Sum of $20,294.00 More or Less, 495 F.
Supp. 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (essential differences exist between civil forfeiture and rule 41(e)
proceedings).
34. 116 U.S. at 633-34. The United States Supreme Court in Boyd addressed the issue whether
the compulsory production of a man's private papers in a forfeiture proceeding against him
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment. Id. at 622.
35. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
36. Id. at 633-34. See also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965)
(forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal in character and, therefore, the exclusionary rule relating
to illegal search and seizure applies).
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the specific violation involved. 37 The general procedure is that once
the property is seized, the seizing officer submits a report, which
includes an appraised value of the property, to the United States
38
attorney for the district in which the property is seized. If the
value of the property is $10,000 or less, notice of the intent to forfeit
is published. 39 If no claim to the property is filed within twenty
days, the property is forfeited and sold without further
proceedings. 40 If, however, the property is valued at more than
$10,000, then a full condemnation hearing is required. 41 It is at this
condemnation hearing that a claimant may intervene and raise all
claims and defenses. 42 From the outset the burden of proof is on the
37. See, e.g., 8 U.S. C. A. § 1324 (West Supp. 1982) (illegal aliens); it U.S.C.A. § 1955(d) (West
Supp. 1982) (violation of gambling laws); 19 U.S.C.A. § 1581 (West 1980) (customs violations); 26
U.S.C.A. § 5872 (West 1980) (firearms violations); 26 U.S.C.A. § 7302 (West 1967) (property used
in violation of the Internal Revenue Code). Commonly used forfeiture statutes are 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 881 (West 1981) (controlled substances) and 49 U.S.C.A. § 781 (West 1963 & Supp. 1982)
(contraband). Each forfeiture statute has a provision stating that customs laws relating to forfeiture
proceedings are to be applied. For example, 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(d) provides that the "law relating to
the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of property for violation of the
custom laws . . . shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred . . . under the provisions of this
subchapter." 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(d) (West 1981). 26 U.S.C.A. § 7327 states that "Itihe provisions of
law applicable to the remission or mitigation by the Secretary or his delegate of forfeitures under the
customs laws shall apply to forfeitures incurred or alleged to have been incurred under the internal
revenue laws." 26 U.S.C.A. § 7327 (West 1967).
38. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1603 (West 1980). Section 1603 states:

lilt

shall be the duty of the appropriate customs officer to report promptly such seizure
or violation to the United States attorney for the district in which such violation has
occurred ... and to include in such a report a statement of all facts and circumstances
...and a citation to the statute ... believed to have been violated....
Id
19 U.S.C.A. § 1606 states that "tluhe appropriate customs officer shall determine the domestic
value, at the time and place of appraisement, of any vessel. vehicle, merchandise, or baggage seized
under the customs laws." 19 U.S.C.A. § 1606 (West 1980).
39. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1607 (West 1980). Section 1607 provides:
[Tihe appropriate customs officer shall cause a notice of the seizure of such articles and
the intention to forfeit and sell or otherwise dispose of the same according to law to be
published for at least three successive weeks in such manner as the Secretary of the
Treasury may direct.
Id.
40. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1609 (West 1980). This section provides for an administrative forfeiture
proceeding and states that if no claim is filed within 20 days, then:
The appropriate customs officer shall declare the vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or
baggage forfeited, and shall sell the same at public auction in the same manner as
merchandise abandoned to the United States is sold ... and shall deposit the proceeds
of sale, after deducting the actual expenses of seizure, publication, and sale in the
Treasury of the United States.
Id.
41. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1610 (West 1980). The statute requires that the appropriate customs officer
transmit a report of the case to the local United States district attorney for the institution of proper
proceedings for the condemnation of the property. Id.
42. Id. See United States v. One 1975 Lincoln Continental, 72 F.R.D. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(forfeiture proper because claimant offered no proof "absolving the vehicle from culpability"). It has
been consistently held that innocence of the owner is not a valid defense to the forfeiture of property
used in a criminal enterprise. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683
(1974).
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claimant to show why the property should not be forfeited. 43 As a
general procedure, enough facts are admitted or stipulated at the
44
hearing to support a motion for summary judgment.
Innocent parties and lienholders with an interest in the seized
property may petition for remission 45 or mitigation 46 rather than
challenge the forfeiture itself. 47 Under this procedure, the petitioner
must aver that he had no knowledge or reason to believe that the
property was being used in violation of the law. 48 The decision
whether to grant the petition is within the sole discretion of the
administrative officer 49 involved in the forfeiture proceedings and is
generally not reviewable by the courts.5 0 Under a petition for
remission or mitigation the administrative officer is not required to
return the forfeited property to the petitioner. 5 1 Rather, if the
petition is approved, the administrative officer may, at his
discretion, order the forfeited property sold and the proceeds
43. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1615 (Wvest 1980). The statute provides that in all suits ot actions brought for
the forfeiture of property seized for violation of anv custorm law, the burden of proof shall rest on the
claimant. If suit is brought for return of the seized goods, the burden of proof will be on the
governmtent only until it has shown probable cause for seizure. Thereafter. the burden will shift to
the plaintiff. Id
44. Since forfeiture cases generally involve onls issues of law and not issues of'fact, a summar
.Judgment serves to condense the proceedings yet preserves the parties' right to appeal. See FED. R.
Csv. P. 56 (a summary.judgment shall be rendered when there is no genuine issue of fact and the
mving part\ is entitled to.judgment as a matter of law).
45. At common law remission was the act by which a forfeiture or penalty was forgiven. BLACK'S
I,As DICTIONARY 1163 (5th ed. 1979). The purpose of remission statutes is to permit the executive
power to relieve the harshness of forfeiture. United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730, 733
(6th Cir. 1964). This power is discretionary so that the executive officer may "temper justice with
merc' and leniencs. " 1d.
46. Mitigation is the reduction, abatement, or diminution ofta penalty imposed by law. BLACK'S
lAVs DICTIONARY 904 (5th ed. 1979).
47. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1618 (West 1980). The statute provides that the Secretary of the Treasury
may remit or mitigate any penalty or forfeiture if he finds that such penalty or forfeiture was incurred
without willful negligence or without any intention on the part of the claimant to violate the law. The
Secretary may remit or mitigate the forfeiture on such terms and conditions as he deems reasonable
and just, including the discontinuance ofany related prosecution. Id.
9
48. 28 C.F.R. § .5(c) (1981). The section requires that a determining official shall not remit or
mitigate a forfeiture unless the petitioner establishes a valid, good faith interest in the property and
establishes that he at no time had knowledge or reason to know that the property was being used in
violation of the law. If the petitioner is a lienholder, he must also establish that he had no knowledge
that the owner had a reputation for violating the law. Id.
The petitioner may not, however, challenge the forfeiture statute's constitutionality. 28 C.F.R.
9.5(b) (1981). The section states that "[tJhe Determining Official shall not consider whether the
evidence is sufficient to support the forfeiture since the filing of a petition presumes a valid
forfeitt re.'' Id.
49. Ifa petition is filed under 19 U.S.C.A. § 1618, the administrative officer is the Secretary of
the Treasury. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1618 (West 1980). If a petition is filed under 28 C.F.R. § 9.3, the
United States Attorney General is the administrative officer. 28 C.F.R. § 9.3 (1981).
50. United States v. One 1972 Mercedes-Benz 250, 545 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1976) (United
States Attorney General's denial of a petition for remission is unreviewable): United States v. One
1970 Buick Riviera. 463 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 US. 980 (1972) (judicial review of
mitigation or remission decisions is restricted to whether there is statutory authority for such
decisions and not to whether the administrative officer correctly decided the merits of the petition).
51. 28 C.F.R. § 9.7(h) (1981). This section states that when the owner of seized property elects
not to conply with the conditions imposed by the administrative officer for release of the property.
the custodian of the property may sell it. After deducting all costs incurred by the government
incident to the seizure, forfeiture, and sale of the property, the custodian pays the owner the balance,
ifany. Id.
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distributed to the innocent party or lienholder, less any costs
incurred by the government.12 Courts have made a distinction
between property that is contraband per se and derivative
contraband.5 3 Contraband per se, or its value, probably will not be
returned under a petition for remission or mitigation since mere
54
possession of such property is illegal.
Neither Kammerer nor Stumpff petitioned for remission or
55
mitigation in United States v. One 1945 Douglas C-54 (DC-4)Aircraft,
nor did Kammerer choose to become a party to the forfeiture
proceedings.5 6 The record before the circuit court in the first appeal
consisted of a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) registration
certificate issued in Stumpff's name, testimony by Kammerer that
he considered himself the true owner of the aircraft, and a blank
bill of sale given to Kammerer by Stumpff, which Kammerer used
as collateral for bail bond money. 57 Based on this evidence the court
questioned whether Stumpff had standing to challenge the
forfeiture, and the court remanded the case for further
58
proceedings.
On remand the district court was presented with additional
evidence and stipulations. 59 The new evidence consisted of receipts
showing that Stumpff had purchased de-icer boots for the aircraft,
that Stumpff had paid fifty dollars for two months storage and
maintenance, and that Stumpff had rented equipment to use in
repairing the aircraft. 60 Based on this evidence, the district court
ruled that Stumpff lacked standing to challenge the forfeiture.61
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling
52. Id. § 9.7(i) (1981). This section provides that although a person holds sufficient interest in
the seized property so that he is eligible to have the property released to him, the property may
neverdieless be retained by the government for official use. The agency which retains the property
itls.,

however, pay the eligible perso

nantiount equal to his net equity, less the government's costs

iitCident to seizIre and
tfrfeiture. Id.
53. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania. 380 U.S. 693 (1965). Contraband per se is
pioterty or objetts of' which mere possession is illegal- Derivative contraband is property that.
Iough not illegal to possess, is put to an illegal use. Id. at 699.
54. Id. The return of contraband per se' would frustrate the express public policy against
possession of such property. Id.
55. 647 F.2d 864 (9(h Cir. 1981). Because both Kammerer and Stumpff intended to use the
aircraft for an illegal purpose, neither would qualify for remission or mitigation. See 28 C.F.R. 5
9.5(c), supra note 48.
56. 647 F.2d at 865. Kaitmerer did not contest the aircraft's fur eiture. Id.
57. Id. at 865-66 (citing 604 F.2d 27). Other evidence included a statement of expenses incurred
0
Ity Stu
tip li maintenance and storage. thei aircraft's bill of sale listing Stunipff as the purchaser, a
reieipt given to Stuntpff in exchange for a $1(11),1 deposit lie made on the purchase price of the
aircrift. wiretapped cinversations between Sttupff and Kammerer in which Kammerer agreed to
supply ihe purchase money for tilt' aircraft, and statements by Kammerer's wife that she discussed

with Stunipffthe possibility of her husband purchasing an airplane. 647 F.2d at 865-66.
58. 604 F.2d at 29.

59. 647 F.2d at 866.
60. Id. There was also evidence that Stumpff failed to pay monthly maintenance costs on the
aircraft as prescribed b' an agreenent between Stuipfftand the governmnti. Id.
6I1. Id. The district court expressly foind that title to (tic aircraft was placed in Stuimpifs name
merely as a subterfuge to conceal the financial affairs and drug dealings of Kanitirer. Id.
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because Kammerer put up all the money for the purchase of the
aircraft and considered himself the true owner. 62 Also of
importance to the court was Stumpff's tender of a blank bill of sale
for the aircraft to Kammerer following Kammerer's arrest. 63 The
court found that Kammerer's use of the bill of sale as collateral for
bond money was evidence that Kammerer had dominion and
control over the aircraft, and therefore Kammerer, not Stumpff,
was the true owner of the aircraft. 64 Citing 49 U.S.C.A. § 140165
the court dismissed the appearance of Stumpff's name on both the
FAA registration certificate and the aircraft's bill of sale as not
determinative of the rights of ownership between Kammerer and
Stumpff. The court concluded that those documents were not
documents of title. 66 Since Kammerer was the true owner of the
aircraft, the court of appeals concurred with the district court and
ruled that the aircraft was placed in Stumpff's name merely as a
"subterfuge"
to conceal the drug dealings of Kammerer. 67
62. Id. at 867. Kammerer first testified that the aircraft was put in Stumpff's name because he,
Kammerer, did not particularily want to own an airplane. Further questioning revealed that
Kammerer lacked the financial capacity to be listed as the aircraft's owner on public records. 604
F.2d at 29. The court, however, does not explain in what way Kammerer lacked this capacity.
63. 604 F.2d at 29. OnJanuary 1, 1978, Stumpff, at Kammerer's request, tendered a blank bill
of sale for the aircraft to Kammerer. However, Kammerer did not complete the document nor
register it with the FAA. Rather, he used the bill of sale as collateral to obtain bail bond money, Id.
64. 647 F.2d at 867. The Eighth Circuit in the first appeal suggested that bare legal title of an
object may be insufficient to establish ownership. 604 F.2d at 28. See United States v. One 1971
Porsche Coupe, 364 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In Porsche the court determined that the owner of
record of the forfeited vehicle was only a "nominal owner" without standing to challenge the
forfeiture since he had made a gift of the car to his son, who had sole possession, dominion, and
control over it. Id. at 748.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also broadly defined ownership as a possessory
interest in a res with its attendant characteristics of dominion and control. 604 F.2d at 28. See United
States v. Fifteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars, 558 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1977). In Fifteen Thousand
the court ruled the claimant lacked standing because she claimed an interest in the safe-deposit box
in which the forfeited money was found rather than an interest in the money itself. Id. at 1361.
65. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (West 1976) (registration of aircraft nationality). The statute states in
pertinent part that "[rlegistration shall not be evidence of ownership of aircraft in any proceeding in
which such ownership by a particular person is, or osay be, in issue." Id.
66. 647 F.2d at 866 (citing 604 F.2d at 29). But see 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1403, 1406 (West 1976).
Section 1403 provides in part:
(a) The Secretary of Transportation shall establish.., a system for the recording
of each and all of the following:
(1) Any conveyance which affects the title to, or any interest in. any civil
aircraft of the United States....
(c) No conveyance. . . shall be valid in respect of such aircraft.., against any
person other than the person by whom the conveyance or other instrument is made or
given... until such conveyance or other instrument is filed for recordation in the office
of the Secretary of Transportation....
(I) Each convevance.., recorded... under the system provided for in subsection
(a). . . of this section shall from the time of its filing for recordation be valid as to all
persons without further or other recordations....
Id. § 1403 (a), (c). (d) (emphasis added).
Section 1406 provides that "lthe validity ofany instrument the recording of which is provided
for by section 1403 of this title shall be governed by the laws of the State, District of Columbia, or
territory or possession of the United States in which such instrument is delivered." Id. § 1406.
(emphasis added).
67. 647 F.2d at 866.
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Therefore, the court of appeals found that Stumpff held an
insufficient interest in the aircraft on which to base standing to
challenge the forfeiture, 68 and hence, the district court had properly
dismissed Stumpff's intervention.

69

Because Stumpff lacked standing to challenge the forfeiture,
the court did not address the constitutionality of the district court's
application of the forfeiture statute.7 0 In the first appeal, however,
the court commented that the district court's decision raised serious
questions concerning the proper construction of the forfeiture
statute involved in this case and the constitutionality of its application.7" The government admitted that it had no evidence to
show that either Kammerer or Stumpff actually used the aircraft to
transport marijuana. 72 Also, the government was not able to link
the aircraft to any specific drug transaction, either past or future. 7 3
The court agreed with Stumpff that something more than bare
4
"intended for use" was required to uphold forfeiture in this case.1
However, since it was doubtful that Stumpff had standing to
challenge the forfeiture, the court did not rule on the constitutional
issue. 7 5 Further, since Stumpff's second appeal did not reach the
68. Id. at 867. Accord United States v. Three Hundred Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred
Sixty Dollars ($364,960.00) in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1981) (party
challenging forfeiture must first establish an interest in the property sufficient to justify standing). In
United States Currency two attorneys claimed to have a valid assignment of the seized money from their
defendant clients. Id. at 322. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case for a determination whether there
was a valid assignment and, therefore, a property interest in the attorneys sufficient to support
standing to challenge the forfeiture. Id. at 328.
69. 647 F.2d 866. The court admits that in some circumstances a bill of sale and registration
certificate may be sufficient to establish an ownership interest. See also United States v. One (1)
Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 436 F. Supp. 1292, 1295-96 (S.D. Ga. 1977) (claimant had standing to
challenge forfeiture when the government dealt with the claimant as sole owner, no other party
claimed an interest, and the aircraft was registered with the FAA in the claimant corporation's name
prior to incorporation). Cf Henry v. Castagnaro, 434 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1980) (claim of equitable
ownership is insufficient to uphold standing of a claimant when the motor vehicle is registered in her
husband's name); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. One 1976 Ford Station Wagon. 395 A.2d 595
(Pa. 1978) (when a wife is not the registered owner, she cannot claim a motor vehicle that has been
ordered returned to its registered owner).
70. 647 F.2d at 867.
71. 604 F.2d at 28. The court cites the following cases as general background: United States v.
United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado
Sedan, 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D.N.H.
1974); United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 374 F. Supp. 277 (D. Minn. 1973). 604 F.2d at 28.
72. 604 F.2d at 28. The wiretap conversations and Kammerer's testimony established only that
the men intended to use the aircraft to transport drugs. The men did, however, undertake to have the
aircraft repaired and to hire a competent pilot. Id.
73. Id. The repairs to the aircraft had not even been completed at the time of seizure, nor had a
qualified pilot been engaged by either of the two men to fly the aircraft. Id.
74. Id. See United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F.2d 1026 (1st Cir. 1980) (car
intended to transport the proceeds ofan illegal narcotics sale not subject to forfeiture); United States
v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D.N.H. 1974) (forfeiture not justified when the vehicle's
only connection to the crime was to lead narcotics agents to the place of sale). But see United States v.
One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977) (that the motor vehicle was used to
transport drug peddlers to scene of sale or to meeting where sale was proposed was sufficient tojustify
forfeiture).
75. 604 F.2d at 28. The court stated that the mere fact that the aircraft was registered in
Stumpff's name did not determine the right of ownership between Stumpffand Kammerer. Further,
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7 6
merits of the case, the constitutional issue was never decided.
Based on the Eighth Circuit decision in One 1945 Douglas DC-4
Aircraft,17 it seems unlikely that federal courts will extend forfeitures
to include property merely "intended for use" in criminal
enterprises unless that property can be linked to a specific illegal
transaction. 7 8 Something more than mere intent will be necessary
to keep statutes that include the "intended for use" language
79
within the bounds of constitutionality.

The decision in One 1945 Douglas DC-4 Aircraft requires more
than bare legal title to establish ownership sufficient to challenge
forfeiture. 80 However, the court of appeals did not discuss the effect
of 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 14038" and 140682 on the legal instruments
naming Stumpff the owner of the aircraft.8 3 Sections 1403 and 1406
would tend to rebut the court's conclusion that the aircraft
documents were not documents of title. 84 Because section 1406
requires that state law govern the validity of aircraft title

instruments, Missouri law relating to the effect of documents of
Ihe court believed that FAA certificates were issued for registration purposes onl' and ,A(1rc lt
certificates of title, Id. at 29.
76. The United States Supreme Court has recognizedthe
dilicuiy of rcctntiling biroad
forfeiture statutes with the fifth amendment due process and ltst cMpen satitt ilartses. United
States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. at 721- The Court has taken thc positin it6.i
viewed in their entirety' forfeiture statutes are intended to impose i penalty only upon thlosc who ar'e
significantly involved in a criminal enterprise. Id. a( 721-22.
77. 604 F.2d 27 (remanded to district court): 647 F.2d 864 (801 Cir. 1981) (affiriwd
unpublished district court's judgment on remand), cert. denied, 102 S.C. 1002 (1982).
78. See Howard v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 540 F.2d 695 (4th Cir. 1976) (general legal policy
opposed to forfeiture); United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 374 F. Supp. 277 (1). Minn. 1973)
(forfeiture subject to careful scrutiny by the courts): United States v One 1961 Ollsriilh. 4- )oor
Sedan. 250 F. Supp. 969 (D.S.C. 1966) (forfeiture enforced only when crnsisnto with brth thr riotr
and spirit of the law).
79. See United States v. United States Ciiin & Currency. 401 U.S. 715 (1971) (firif'titurc sitatis
are intended to penalize only those sign ificantly involved in aicito
nl crto
irprisi): Unitied Sratis v.
One 1970 Buick Riviera, 374 F. Supp. 277 (1). Minn. 1973) (mere use irfan aitoiabile to iranslport
a would-be drug buyer to Mexico is not facilitation). Courts are construing the United Stits
Supreme Court's 'significant participation" language in Coin & ('urrerl,, 401 U.S. ;it 721-22. as
intending to restrict the use and application oftfirfeitiore statutes. See,er.. United States v. One 1972
Datsun. 378 F. Supp. 1200, 1204 (D.N.H. 1974) (dcrivaivc cintraband ILust fi stIbsiitfniall and
instrumentally connected with illegal behavior before it is subject r forfe iturc).
80. 604 F.2d at 28; see aso United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Leiians. 621 F.2d 444 (1st Cir.
1980) (registration of vehicle in innocent wife's name is niot alonc suflicint basis rio which to
challenge forfeiture); United States v. One 1971 Prsche Coupe, 364 F. Supp. 745 (F.D). Pa. 1173)
(registered owner was only a "nominal owner" who had made a gift of the car to his sot. dti son had
complete dominion and control over the vehiclI).
81.49 U.S.C.A. 5 1403 (\'est 1976).
82. Id. § 1406.
83. Most courts hold that § 1401 has preempted the field by cnacing a system
i
fairr raft ii,
registration and recordation. Therefore, state recording statutes are inapplicable to instruienis f
title in aircraft. State Securities Co. v. Aviation Enterprises, Inc., 355 F.2d 225, 229 (10th Cir. 1966)
(construing 49 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (West 1976)). Hiwever, most courts also hold that Congress did rir
intend § 1401 to preempt state law that would otherwise govern priorities of lien and title interests in
aircraft. E.g., Haynes v. General Electric Credit Corp., 432 F. Supp. 763. 765 (W.). Va. 1977).
qff'dpercuriam. 582 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978) (construing49 U.S.C.A. §1401 (West 1976)).
84. Section 1401 appears to apply only to certificates cIf registration and therefore would not
include a bill of sale. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (West 1976). An aircraft bill of' sale would be recrded
under S 1403(a), which provides that the Secretary of Transportation shall establish a system for
recording any conveyance which affects the title to any civil aircraft. Id. § 1403(a).
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Stumpff or
title should have been applied to determine whether
85
Kammerer had ownership rights in the aircraft.
The North Dakota criminal forfeiture statute is chapter 29-31
of the North Dakota Century Code. 8 6 Like the federal statutes,
section 29-31-06 allows for a procedure similar to a petition for
remission or mitigation.8 7 However, under the North Dakota
statute the petition is presented to a district court rather than to an
administrative officer. 88 Therefore, the result is reviewable on the
merits by the courts. 89 Further, under the North Dakota statute
innocence of the owner of seized property is a defense to
forfeiture. 90 Therefore, it appears that the North Dakota forfeiture
statute is less harsh than the federal statutes. 9 1
In State v. Simpson, 92 which was not decided under the North
Dakota forfeiture statute, the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that there must be ajudicial determination, complete with notice to
the owner, finding that the seized property was used in a criminal
enterprise before personal property could be forfeited. 93 Therefore,
85. See, e.g., Bitzer-Croft Motors, Inc. v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 1, 401
N.E.2d 1340 (App. Ct. 1980) (underlying validity of aircraft title instruments is resolved under state
law):.J. C. Equipment, Inc. v. Sky Aviation, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (questions of
validity of title documents are resolved under state law).
86. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 29-31 (1974) (confiscation of equipment used in commission of
crime).
87. Id- § 29-31-06 (1974). The statute provides in part:
If... any claimant shall prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is the owner of
such property or has a valid and bona fide lien thereon duly filed and recorded prior to
the time such vehicle was seized and that he had no knowledge of the use of such
vehicle or conveyance for such unlawful purpose, the court shall order such property
to be surrendered to him, if the owner. If the claimant is a lien holder, the lien shall be
foreclosed and the property sold, and the proceeds from such sale shall be applied in
payment of the costs of the sale and the satisfaction of the lien or liens.
Id.
88. Id. Section 29-31-06 also states that "lilfan answer is filed or a claim made, the district court
9
shall proceed to hear and determine the claim according to law." Id. Cf 28 C.F.R. § .3(a) (1981) (a
petition for remission or mitigation shall be addressed to the Attorney General).
89. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-31-06. When a federal petition for remission or mitigation is filed
with either the Secretary of the Treasury under 19 U.S.C.A. 5 1618 or the United States Attorney
General under 28 C.F.R. § 9.3, the administrative officer's decision is not reviewable unless abuse of
discretion can be shown. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1618 (West 1980); 28 C.F.R. S 9.3 (1981); seeUnited States
v. One 1973 Buick Riviera, 560 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1977) (overwhelming weight of authority holds
that a denial ofa petition for remission is not reviewable); United States v. One 1971 Porsche Coupe,
364 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (by long-standing, judge-made rule the United States Attorney
General's decision is unreviewable).
90. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-31-02 (1974). If the owner is found innocent of all connection with
the felony on which the forfeiture is based, the vehicle is returned to him. Id.
91. There are no reported North Dakota cases in which chapter 29-31 of the North Dakota
Century Code has been applied.
92. 78 N.D. 440, 49 N.W.2d 790 (1951) (the only North Dakota case dealing with forfeiture of
property based on a criminal enterprise, Simpson involved the destruction of personal property seized
following a raid on a bawdy house).
93. State v. Simpson, 78 N.D. 440, 449, 49 N.W.2d 790, 796 (1951). The North Dakota
Supreme Court adopts the position that harmless property cannot be summarily forfeited by the
exercise of police power. When the taking of property does not involve protecting the public welfare,
but rather is intended as punishment for criminal behavior, judicial proceedings are required. Id.
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it appears that neither North Dakota statutory law nor North
Dakota case law allows administrative forfeiture proceedings such
as those found in the federal statutes. 94 Hence, all criminal
forfeitures in North Dakota will be judicially determined.

BRUCE MERWYN ANDERSON

94. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-31-03 provides that the district court shall order the confiscated
property forfeited. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-31-03 (1974). Cf 19 U.S.C.A. § 1609 (West 1980) (the
appropriate customs officer shall declare the property forfeited).

